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Important Steps and Instructive Models in
the Fight to Eliminate Violence
Against Women
Elizabeth M. Mislaveg*
[V]iolence against women constitutes a violation of their human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and impairs or nullifies the observance, enjoyment
and exercise of such rights and freedoms I
[Violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and
discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full
advancement of women 2
I. Introduction
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence against Women (UN Declaration) on
December 20, 1993. 3 Six months later, on June 9, 1994, the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted, by
acclamation, the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment
and Eradication of Violence Against Women (Inter-Amencan Convention).4
These human rights instruments mark an important achievement in the
* I greatly appreciate the insights and guidance of Professor Frederic Kirgis and the
year-long editorial support of Mike Bosh. I also would like to thank Susan Misiaveg and
Apur Patel for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Note, as well as Chuck
Misiaveg for his calm rescue of an important draft lost somewhere in the recesses of my
computer.
1. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women, "Convention of Bel6m do Pard," June 9, 1994, pmbl., 33 I.L.M.
1534 (1994) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
2. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1994) [hereinafter UN Declaration].
3. Id.
4. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1.
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recognition of violence against women as a violation of basic human rights,
and they signify an important step m the effort to eliminate violence against
women.
5
OAS member states may sign the Inter-American Convention,6 and the
convention has the binding force of a treaty on those states that sign and
ratify It.7 As a regional human rights instrument, the Inter-American Con-
5. See, e.g., Priority Themes, Peace: Measures to Eradicate Violence Against Women
in the Family and Society: Report by the Secretary-General, Commission on the Status of
Women, 38th Sess., Agenda Item 5(c), 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6!1994/4 (1994) (report on
1993 expert group meeting organized by UN Division for the Advancement of Women)
(describing establishment of international norm that absolutely denounces violence against
women as "obvious first step" in process of working toward elimination of violence against
women, and giving UN Declaration as example of establishment of such norm); Layli Miller
Bashir, New Trend in Addressing Violence Against Women, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (The American
University Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,Washington, D.C.), Fall 1994,
at 2, 15 (stating that Inter-American Convention makes important contribution on issue of
violence against women); Hilary Charlesworth, The Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Violence Against Women, ASIL INSIGHT (The American Society of International
Law, Washington, D.C.), 1994, at 2 (pinpointing as most significant element of UN
Declaration its unequivocal acknowledgement that violence against women is international
issue and that states must make effort to eliminate violence against women); Rhonda Copelon,
Intimate Terror- Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 116, 143 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994) (stating that approval of Inter-American Convention is critical step in international
recognition that violence against women is distinct human rights abuse); UN Makes Strides
on Violence Against Women, DOCKET (International Human Rights Law Group, Washington,
D.C.), June 1994, at 1 (quoting Donna Sullivan, Director of International Human Rights Law
Group's Women in the Law Project, as stating that UN Declaration is first instrument
expressly to define and denounce violence against women).
6. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 15; see Joan Fitzpatrick, The Use
of International Human Rights Norms to Combat Violence Against Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS
OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 532, 557 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994) (noting that Inter-American Convention would only be open to OAS states for signature
and ratification). The Inter-American Convention is also "open to accession by any other
state." Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17
7 See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 16 (stating that Inter-American
Convention is subject to ratification). As of July 24, 1995, the following countries had signed
the Inter-American Convention: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See Chart and
Explanatory Notes on Status of Convention of Bel6m do ParA, from Mercedes L. Kremen-
etzky, Comision Interamericana de Mujeres (CIM), Organization of American States 2-3
(July 24, 1995) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). According to Article 21
of the Inter-American Convention, the Inter-American Convention enters into force 30 days
after the second instrument of ratification is deposited with the OAS General Secretariat.
Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 21. Pursuant to that provision, the Inter-
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vention may be a particularly effective tool m combating violence against
women; a regional instrument can respond to the problem of violence
against women as the problem exists within a particular part of the world and
can use approaches that are particularly suited to that region.9 Professor
Joan Fitzpatrick notes that the Inter-American Convention "could provide an
instructive precedent for standard-setting at the regional level as well as for
further development of implementation measures by UN bodies."'"
The UN Declaration, adopted by the UN General Assembly, has um-
versal applicability" but lacks the binding force of a treaty Still, even
though it lacks a treaty's binding effect, a UN declaration does have the
American Convention entered into force on March 5, 1995. Chart and Explanatory Notes
from Mercedes L. Kremenetzky, supra at 1. As of July 24, 1995, eleven countries had
ratified the Inter-American Convention. 1d. at 3.
8. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 557 (citing regional conventions on torture as
demonstrating usefulness of regional focus on human rights issue). Specifically, Professor
Fitzpatrick names, as examples of successful regional human rights efforts, the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, Pan-Am U.T.S. 67, 25
I.L.M. 519 (1986), and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126. Fitzpatrick,
supra note 6, at 571 n.209.
A lawyer consultation group gathered in 1992 at the University of Toronto to discuss
women's international human rights law. Rebecca J. Cook, Women's International Human
Rights Law: The Way Foriward, 15 HUM. RTs. Q. 230, 231 (1993). One topic that the group
covered was the question of the effectiveness of a "rights" strategy in meeting women's
needs. Id. at 232-33. A Nigerian participant noted that a "basic needs" strategy would be
a more relevant approach for Africa than a "rights" strategy Id. at 232. See generally
Adetoun 0. Ilumoka, African Women's Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights - Toward a
Relevant Theory and Practice, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES 307 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (addressing significance to African
women of "human rights discourse" and examining problems regarding enforcement on behalf
of African women of internationally recognized rights). Another participant stated that
"rights discourse" lacks strength in Asia partly because such discourse focuses on women's
independence and not on the connectedness with community, caste, or ethnic group that is
typically the reality of Asian women. Rebecca J. Cook, supra, at 232. A Sudanese partici-
pant of the consultation group, while recognizing that cultural factors play a role in
determining how effective a particular strategy will be within a particular setting, stressed that
"we must not lose sight of the fact that we are subordinated because we are women" and that
the goal of ridding society of the subordination of women is universal. Id. at 233.
9. See Cook, supra note 8, at 256-57 (stating that regional advocacy has some assets
that global measures lack, such as regional economic interdependence and cultural likeness,
which can contribute to development and application of human rights norms).
10. Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 557
11. See Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that UN Declaration applies to all UN
members); Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 557 (stating that UN Declaration would have univer-
sal coverage).
1111
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1109 (1995)
power to affect the behavior of member states. 12  For example, a UN
declaration establishes the expectation that states will adhere to the
responsibilities outlined in the declaration.' 3 As state practice fortifies that
general expectation, a declaration may become a part of binding customary
law 14 Moreover, a UN declaration possesses political force as an expres-
sion of international will.'5 Indeed, in commenting on the UN Declaration
in its draft form, Donna J Sullivan (Director of the Women in the Law
Project of the International Human Rights Law Group) has suggested that
people should view the UN Declaration as a manifestation of international
political consensus that states have a responsibility to prevent and to redress
gender-based violence. 6 In addition, a declaration is often the forerunner
of a binding treaty covenng the same issue.' 7 Thus, the UN Declaration
12. See Hurst Hannum, Human Rights, In 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 319, 336-
38 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (discussing impact of UN declar-
ations in context of international human rights law); see also mfra notes 13-16 and accom-
panying text (discussing ways in which UN declarations have influence on behavior of states).
13. See UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS
309, 5 (1988) (quoting 1962 memorandum from UN Office of Legal Affairs, which
explains that because United Nations organs adopt declarations only for issues of major
importance, expectation is that states will adhere to that declaration).
14. See id. (explaining that "insofar as the expectation [of adherence to a UN declara-
tion] is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized
as laying down rules binding, upon the States").
15. See Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that United Nations resolutions are
significant statements of international views).
16. See Donna J. Sullivan, Women's Human Rights and the 1993 World Conference on
Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 152, 164-65 (1994) (stating that UN Declaration draft
shows international political consensus on recognition that states have duties to prevent and
redress acts of gender-based violence). Justice Elizabeth Evatt suggests that proponents will
have to persuade human rights treaty bodies to use the UN Declaration to interpret existing
human rights norms as including acts of gender-based violence as violations. Elizabeth Evatt,
Book Review, 7 HARV HUM. RTS. J. 295, 298 (1994) (reviewing OURS BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S
RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanna Kerr ed., 1993)). Because the UN Declaration requires
no additional ratifying act for a state to see it as a statement of generally accepted legal
principles, Justice Evatt concludes that the UN Declaration may be most useful as a basis
upon which activists can promote national reform. Id.
17 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M.
535 (1985) (referring in preamble to declaration on same subject as one factor underlying
agreement of states parties to convention); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter Women's
Convention] (same); see also Hannum, supra note 12, at 336 (noting that UN declarations are
viewed as step in process toward adoption of binding convention).
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mght be a precursor to a UN convention on the elimnnation of violence
against women.18
As the preceding paragraphs illustrate, the UN Declaration and the
Inter-American Convention are important both in their own right and as
instructive models for future human rights instruments on violence against
women.' 9 They are also invaluable touchstones for discussion on a number
of significant issues m the on-going development of international law on
women's rights.20 For example, a comparison of the UN Declaration and
the Inter-American Convention provides an instructive framework for
analysis. Insights gained from this comparison could inform the drafting
process of a later UN or regional convention on the elimnation of violence
against women.21
18. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 557 (noting that UN Declaration could be precursor
to UN convention on violence against women); Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism
to Enforce Women's Right to State Protection from Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34
HARv INT'L L.J 507, 530 (1993) (stating that UN Declaration could lead to binding UN
convention on elimination of violence against women). The desirability of drafting a UN
convention on the subject of violence against women must be weighed against some risks:
the risk of promoting confusion as to the coverage of violence against women by existing
mternational human rights instruments; the risk of getting only limited ratification; and the
costs of implementing a new international instrument. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 537-
38 (listing aforementioned criticisms of drafting new instrument on violence against women).
19. See supra notes 10, 18 and accompanying text (indicating that UN Declaration could
be precursor document for subsequent convention and that Inter-American Convention could
be resource for future drafters).
20. See mfra notes 32-44 and accompanying text (discussing "public-private distinction"
and that distinction's relationship to theories of state accountability under international law).
Another issue particularly relevant to the development of international law with respect to
women's rights is the question of whether the international community should focus its efforts
on placing women's rights mto the work of "mainstream" international human rights bodies
or whether it should create specialized mechanisms, such as the UN Declaration and the Inter-
American Convention, to deal exclusively with women's rights. See Hilary Charlesworth,
What are "Women's International Human Rights"?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTrIvES 58, 58-59, 66 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994)
(discussing comparative worth of putting women's rights issues into work of mainstream
human rights bodies and of creating specialized mechanisms for women's rights issues);
Copelon, supra note 5, at 117 (stating that, in addition to recognizing gender-based violence
as torture, it is essential to recognize expressly that violence against women is human rights
violation in and of itself).
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (pointing out value of Inter-American
Convention as informative precedent); supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (discussing
UN Declaration as possible forerunner to UN convention on elimination of violence against
women).
1113
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1109 (1995)
One specific point of comparison, and this Note's focus, is the UN
Declaration's qualifying references to national legislation in Articles 4(c) and
4(d) of the UN Declaration's list of state responsibilities z2 and the absence
of such references to national legislation m the comparable provisions of the
Inter-American Convention.' Commentators have suggested that the UN
Declaration's references to national legislation allow the use of national,
rather than international, standards to judge a state's fulfillment of its
responsibilities under Articles 4(c) and 4(d) and that the references could
weaken these UN Declaration provisions substantially 24 The question arises
whether a state could use the UN Declaration's references to national
legislation to define its own standard of compliance regarding its responsibil-
ities under the UN Declaration with respect to the punishment and the
redress of violence against women. If that is the effect of the UN Declara-
tion's references to national legislation, a state could justify a clearly
inadequate effort at punishing and remedying acts of violence against women
and, thereby, seriously impair the very rights that the UN Declaration seeks
to protect.
In order to provide the necessary background for a comparative
discussion of the UN Declaration and the Inter-American Convention, Part II
of this Note looks briefly at the development of, and some of the issues that
pertain to, international human rights law with respect to violence against
women.' Part II also places the UN Declaration and the Inter-American
Convention in the context of this developing area of international law ' In
22. UN Declaration, supra note 2, at arts. 4(c), 4(d). Article 4(c) of the UN Declara-
tion says that states should exercise due diligence to punish, "in accordance with national
legislation," acts of violence against women. Id. at art. 4(c). Article 4(d) calls states to
provide women subjected to violence with access, "as provided for by national legislation,"
to just and effective remedies. Id. at art. 4(d).
23. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 7(b), 7(g). Article 7(b) states,
without qualification by way of reference to national legislation, that states parties undertake
to use due diligence to impose penalties for violence against women. Id. at 7(b). Article 7(g)
says that states parties undertake to "establish the necessary legal and administrative mech-
anisms to ensure that women subjected to violence have effective access to restitution, repara-
tions or other just and effective remedies." Id. at art. 7(g).
24. See Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 3-4 (viewing UN Declaration's references to
national, instead of international, standards as problematic); Sullivan, supra note 16, at 166
(stating that national legislation references undermine normative force of UN Declaration's
state responsibility provision).
25. See infra part II (highlighting aspects of development of international human rights
law in area of violence against women).
26. See nfra part Il (discussing UN Declaration and Inter-American Convention within
context of developing area of international human rights law with respect to violence against
1114
ELIMINATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Part I, this Note contrasts the UN Declaration's inclusion of references to
national legislation m its delineation of state responsibilities with the Inter-
American Convention's lack of national legislation references m its com-
parable provisions.' Part 11 discusses the implications of interpreting the
UN Declaration to defer to national standards.' Part Im also suggests an
alternative interpretation of the UN Declaration's references to national
legislation sunply as procedural provisos. 9 In Part IV, this Note concludes
that one could interpret these references to national legislation as mere
procedural provisos, rather than as loopholes that would allow individual
states to evade their substantive responsibilities under the UN Declaration.3"
This Note also concludes that the dangers associated with interpreting the
national legislation references as a means of evading genuine compliance are
sufficiently grave to call for the exclusion of these references in future
instruments."1 To allow a state to define its own standard of compliance with
an international human rights norm would weaken substantially that norm's
effectiveness in fostering global change in the treatment of women.
I. Background: The Development of International Human Rights
Law on Violence Against Women
An issue particularly relevant to a discussion about international human
rights law as it relates to the issue of violence against women centers on the
"public-private distinction." 32 In the words of Professor Hilary Charles-
women).
27 See infra part III.A (contrasting UN Declaration's state duty provisions containing
references to national legislation with comparable Inter-American provisions that do not have
similar qualifying references to national legislation).
28. See infra part III.A.1-2 (examining implications of UN Declaration's references to
national legislation in UN Declaration's list of state responsibilities).
29. See infra part 111.B (discussing interpretation of references to national legislation
as procedural provisos).
30. See infra part IV (concluding that UN Declaration's references to national legis-
lation may be interpreted as merely proviso on exercise of rights in question, not as means
of impairing substantive rights in UN Declaration).
31. See infra part IV (concluding that severe negative implications of interpretation of
UN Declaration's references to national legislation as deferring to national standards to judge
state compliance with UN Declaration responsibilities justify exclusion of such references in
future instruments).
32. See, e.g., Bashir, supra note 5, at 2, 15 (noting women's rights activists' emphasis
on importance of state accountability for private conduct that impairs human rights); Cook,
supra note 8, at 234-35 (discussing public-private distinction and that distinction's relationship
1115
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worth, "all international human rights law rests on and reinforces a distinc-
tion between public and private worlds, and this distinction operates to
muffle, and often completely silence, the voices of women."33 There are
distinct, yet interrelated, ways to formulate the public-private distinction.'
First, one may view the public-private distinction as reflecting the traditional
view that distinguishes between the private domestic world and the public
world of legal and political order.35 Generally, domestic life is deemed to
be part of the private world, a world in which legal regulation is inappropri-
ate. 6 Yet, as Professor Charlesworth notes, it is often in the domestic realm
that women face the danger of violence.37 Protection of privacy is the
common justification for this superficially neutral governmental non-
interference. 8 But a deeper look reveals the realistic effect of a govern-
ment's maction in this context: A reinforcement of an unjust status quo and
a means of creating a "space into which the law's ordinary protections
against violence will not be allowed to penetrate."39
A second and closely related way to formulate the public-private
distinction is as international law's distinction between governments' acts
and private individuals' acts and that distinction's relationship to theories of
state accountability for violence perpetrated against women.' Under the
traditional theory of state responsibility, international human rights law
imposed a negative obligation on a state: A state had a duty not to interfere
to women's international human rights); Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 58 (same); Kenneth
Roth, Domestic Violence as an International Human Rights Issue, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WoMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIvEs 326, 329-33 (Rebecca J. Cook ed.,
1994) (same).
33. Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 68.
34. See Cook, supra note 8, at 234 (stating that at least two ways exist to conceptualize
public-private distinctions).
35. Id.
36. Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 69; see Cook, supra note 8, at 234 (noting that
private world comprised of home and family has been deemed inappropriate context for
regulation).
37 Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 70.
38. Id.
39 Id. (quoting Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 59, 65); see Cook, supra note 8, at 234 (pointing out that public-private distinction
is gendered because women often act within private world where abuses are "invisible" and
unregulated).
40. See Cook, supra note 8, at 234 (stating that second way to perceive public-private
distinction is as distinction between public sector composed of state activities and private
sector composed of nonstate activities).
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with human rights.4 ' Through an evolution of this theory of state account-
ability with respect to human rights, international law now additionally may
require states to exercise due diligence m preventing and punishing systemic
human rights violations that private, nonstate actors perpetrate.42
The UN Declaration and the Inter-American Convention broadly define
violence against women to encompass physical, sexual, and psychological
violence that occurs both in the family and in the general community, as well
as such violence that a state perpetrates or condones.43 In reaching violence
against women within the family, the UN Declaration and the Inter-
American Convention deal with a subject that international law formerly did
not regulate because these human rights instruments encompass private, as
well as state, conduct.'
41. See id. (describing traditional state duty as obligation not to interfere with mdivid-
ual's human rights).
42. See d. at 234-35 (containing explanation that international law now requires states
to employ due diligence m order to prevent, investigate, and punish flagrant, systemic human
rights violations committed by private actors); infra notes 108-22 and accompanying text
(discussing impact on state accountability of provisions in international human rights instru-
ments that obligate states to "ensure" rights recognized m those instruments).
43. See UN Declaration, supra note 2, at arts. 1, 2 (defining violence against women
broadly); Inter-Amencan Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 1, 2 (same). Article 2 of the UN
Declaration provides a nonexhaustive list of examples that constitute violence against women
within the meaning of the UN Declaration, including battering, sexual abuse of female
children, marital rape, female genital mutilation, nonspousal violence, rape, sexual harass-
ment, and forced prostitution. UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 2. Article 2 of the
Inter-American Convention similarly gives examples of conduct that constitute violence
against women. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 2. Furthermore, Article
3 of the Inter-American Convention emphasizes that the coverage of the definition of violence
against women includes private as well as state action: "Every woman has the right to be free
from violence in both the public and private spheres." Id. at art. 3.
People in the human rights field often refer to violence against women as "gender-based
violence," which includes violence perpetrated against women because they are women and
violence that disproportionately affects women. See General Recommendation 19, U.N.
GAOR, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess., 6,
U.N. Doe. A/47/38 (1992) (defining "gender-based" violence as violence directed at women
because they are women and as violence that disproportionately affects women); Observations
Received from Governments on the Preliminary Suggested Text of an Inter-American
Convention Dealing with Women and Violence, at 24, OEA/ser.L/II.7.5, CIM/RECOVI/doc.
5/93 (1993) (observations by United States) (describing "gender-based violence" as violence
directed at women because they are women and as violence that disproportionately affects
women); Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that violence against women is often
conceptualized as "gendered violence" to stress fact that violence against women is not simply
random aggression).
44. See Bashir, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that domestic violence traditionally is deemed
1117
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The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimnmation
Against Women (Women's Convention), 45 which the UN General Assembly
adopted m 1979, is one of the key international human rights instruments on
the protection of women's rights.' In 1992, the Committee on the Elimma-
tion of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)47 adopted General Recom-
mendation 19, which expressly recognized that the Women's Convention
covers gender-based violence.48 In General Recommendation 19, CEDAW
stated that gender-based violence falls within the meaning of discrimination
in Article 1 of the Women's Convention49 and that gender-based violence
may violate a provision of the Women's Convention even though the
provision does not refer expressly to violence against women.5°
CEDAW characterized violence against women as a type of discrimina-
tion because of the consequences of gender-based violence for women.5'
to be outside scope of international law because domestic violence is perpetrated by private,
not state, actors); UN Makes Strides on Violence against Women, supra note 5, at 1 (stating
that international law usually involves state conduct and that UN Declaration enters "delicate,
previously forbidden territory"); see also Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that vio-
lence against women traditionally is seen as beyond scope of international law).
45. Women's Convention, supra note 17; see HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES app. A (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (listing states
that had ratified Women's Convention as of January 21, 1994); NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, UNITED NATIONS HANDBOOK: 1994 56 (1994) (stating
that, as of January 18, 1994, Women's Convention had 132 recorded ratifications and
accessions).
46. Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 1 (identifying Women's Convention as major UN
convention on women); Culliton, supra note 18, at 510-11 (describing Women's Convention
as "hallmark of the United Nations' work on women's rights").
47 Article 17 of the Women's Convention established the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 45, at 56. States parties to the Women's Convention elect
the CEDAW members from their nationals with consideration paid to attaining equitable
representation with respect to geography, cultures, and principal legal systems. Id. The
CEDAW members are experts, who serve in their personal, rather than in an official,
capacity Id. The CEDAW considers reports of states parties to the Women's Convention
and monitors the progress in implementation of the Women's Convention. Id. Each year the
CEDAW reports to the UN General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council.
Id.
48. General Recommendation 19, supra note 43, 6-7
49. See id. 7 (stating that gender-based violence is discrimination under Article 1 of
Women's Convention).
50. Id. 6.
51. See id. 1, 11 (discussing discriminatory effect of violence against women,
namely that gender-based violence deprives women of enjoyment of human rights and
1118
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Specifically, CEDAW described violence against women as significantly
interfering with women's enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms on an equal level with men.Y Some of the specific rights of
women that gender-based violence may impair include the right to life, the
right to equality in the family, the right to liberty and security of person, and
the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment.53 In addition, CEDAW recognized the role that discrimination
plays in the perpetuation of violence against women.' For example,
CEDAW stated that traditional beliefs which accord women a subordinate
status to men perpetuate and justify abusive conduct toward women, such as
domestic violence and dowry-related deaths.5 This relationship between
discrimination against women and violence against women seems to be the
essence of CEDAW's interpretation that gender-based violence falls within
the defimtion of discrimination.56 As CEDAW noted, only with efforts to
eliminate violence against women can the Women's Convention fully achieve
its purpose of eliminating all forms of discrimination against women.5s
In General Recommendation 19, CEDAW stressed that the Women's
Convention reaches not only violence perpetrated by or on behalf of a
government, but also violence perpetrated by private persons. 58 Article 2(e)
of the Women's Convention says that states parties should take the
appropriate measures to eliminate gender-based discrimination by "any
person, organization or enterprise. '59  CEDAW pointed to Article 2(e)'s
fundamental freedoms equal to that possessed by men).
52. See id. (stating that violence against women has practical effect of denying women
equal enjoyment of their rights and freedoms).
53. See id. 7 (listing some human rights and fundamental freedoms that gender-based
violence impairs or nullifies).
54. See id. 11 (stating that attitudes that subordinate women perpetuate violent
practices against women).
55. Id.
56. See id. 4 (recognizing close relationship between discrimination against women,
violence against women, and human rights violations).
57 See id. 5 (stating that full implementation of Women's Convention necessitates
that states act affirmatively to eliminate violence against women).
58. See id. 9 (stating that Women's Convention does not reach only state-perpetrated
violence). Katherine M. Culliton states that the Women's Convention and General Recom-
mendation 19 "may be extremely useful as a means to overcome the argument that domestic
violence is a 'private' issue beyond the reach of international enforcement mechanisms."
Culliton, supra note 18, at 527
59. See Women's Convention, supra note 17, at art. 2(e) (stating that state has obliga-
tion to take all appropriate means to end discrimination against women that "any person,
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language as part of its rationale for interpreting discrimnation under the
Women's Convention to extend beyond state actionY' CEDAW concluded
that "[u]nder general international law and specific human rights covenants,
States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due
diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of
violence, and for providing compensation."
6'
Other notable achievements in the international human rights arena on
the subject of violence against women have occurred in recent years. In
1985, the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of
the United Nations Decade for Women, which took place in Nairobi,
adopted the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of
Women.62 The Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of
Women recognized violence against women as a major obstacle to equality,
development, and peace. 63 In June 1993, the Second World Conference on
organization or enterprise" commits).
60. See General Recommendation 19, supra note 43, 9 (noting that Article 2(e) of
Women's Convention requires states parties to take necessary measures to eliminate dis-
crimination against women committed by any person, organization, or enterprise).
61. Id. 9 At the 1992 lawyer consultation group meeting at the University of
Toronto, Manfred Nowak noted that, even given the evolution of international human rights
law, state responsibility still arises at a level once removed from the perpetrator's act of
violence. Cook, supra note 8, at 235. A state may bear responsibility for a failure to act
with due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish, and remedy acts of violence against
women, but current international law would not hold a state accountable for a specific act of
domestic violence itself. See Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. Q) No.
4, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 35, 172 (saying that state
may be accountable for private act that violates human rights that American Convention on
Human Rights recognizes, "not because of the act itself," but for state's lack of due diligence
to prevent or respond to the violation); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP,
WRITTEN COMMENTS TO THE INTER-SESSIONAL WORKING GROUP OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE STATUS OF WOMEN TO FURTHER DEVELOP A DRAFT DECLARATION ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 13 (1992) (commenting that duty to exercise "due diligence" imposes limits
on when state is accountable under UN Declaration for violence against women perpetrated
by private actors). Nowak stated that this limitation results not from gender bias, but from
the nature of international law. Cook, supra note 8, at 235.
62. Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the
United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, ch. I, sec. A, 258,
A/CONF.116/28/Rev 1(1986).
63. Id. 258; see UN Declaration, supra note 2, at pmbl. (acknowledging Nairobi
Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women's recommendation of measures
to fight gender-based violence and recognition of violence against women as major obstacle
to equality, development, and peace); Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing Nairobi
Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women).
1120
ELIMINATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Human Rights adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.' 4
In the Vienna Declaration, the World Conference on Human Rights urged
the UN General Assembly to adopt the UN Declaration and emphasized the
importance of eliminating violence against women in both the public and the
private spheres.s In 1994, the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed
Radhika Coomaraswamy as the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women.' Special rapporteurs, who investigate and report on particular
human rights matters, are considered extremely valuable and effective
human rights advocates.67 In September 1995, the Fourth World Conference
on Women in Beijing, China, will address violence against women. 68
In summary, the continuing development of international human rights
law in the area of violence against women requires work on a number of
fronts, including work on theories of state accountability 69 The Inter-
American Convention and the UN Declaration are significant steps in, and
will be instructive models for, this developing area of international human
rights law
64. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993),
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993).
65. Id. 38, 32 I.L.M. 1678; see Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that Vienna
Declaration on Human Rights declared that gender-based violence is human rights issue);
Sullivan, supra note 16, at 152 (stating that Second World Conference on Human Rights
crystallized consensus on need to examine gender-based violence in terms of human rights
norms and gender discrimination).
66. Bashir, supra note 5, at 2, 15 (discussing UN Commission on Human Rights
appointment of Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women); Charlesworth, supra note
5, at 4 (same); UN Makes Strides on Violence against Women, supra note 5, at 10 (same).
67 Bashir, supra note 5, at 15 (discussing view that special rapporteurs are extremely
effective at putting particular human rights issues prominently in front of international com-
munity); Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that special rapporteurs are considered
highly effective).
68. See Commission on the Status of Women: Report on the Thirty-eighth Session, U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. No. 7, ch. V, 32, U.N. Doc. E/1994/27, EICN.6/1994/14 (1994) (dis-
cussing preparations for Fourth World Conference on Women and noting that elimination of
violence against women is "particularly crucial issue"); see also Charlesworth, supra note 5,
at 4 (stating that violence against women will be major theme at Fourth World Conference
on Women).
69. See Cook, supra note 8, at 250-51 (stating that consensus of lawyer consultation
group was that more work is required regarding theories of state responsibility to hold state
liable for not preventing, investigating, and punishing violations of women's rights); Culliton,
supra note 18, at 511 (stating that public-private distinction is difficult to surmount, but that
recent developments demonstrate expansion in concept of state responsibility under inter-
national human rights law).
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IlL Comparison: The Inclusion of Qualifying References to
National Legislation in the UN Declaration and the Absence of Such
References in the Inter-American Convention
A. Interpretation of the UN Declaration as Deferrmng to
National Standards
The UN Declaration qualifies some state responsibilities with references
to national legislation.'0 Specifically, Article 4(c) of the UN Declaration
instructs states to "[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in
accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against
women. 7' Article 4(d) says, in part, that "women who are subjected to
violence should be provided with access to the mechanisms of justice and,
as provided for by national legislation, to just and effective remedies for the
harm that they have suffered. "' The Inter-American Convention states,
without qualification by reference to national legislation, that the states
parties undertake to "apply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose
penalties for violence against women7 3 and to "establish the necessary legal
and administrative mechanisms to ensure that women subjected to violence
have effective access to restitution, reparations or other just and effective
remedies. "'
An expert group, which met in November 1991, prepared a draft
declaration on the elimination of violence against women.75 This draft
declaration did not include qualifying references to national legislation in its
listing of state responsibilities.76 An mtersessional working group of the UN
70. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (reciting UN Declaration language in
Articles 4(c) and 4(d) that qualifies certain state responsibilities by reference to national legis-
lation).
71. UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 4(c) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at art. 4(d) (emphasis added).
73. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 7(b).
74. Id. at art. 7(g).
75. See Priority Themes, Peace: Measures to Eradicate Violence Against Women in the
Family and Society: Report by the Secretary-General, supra note 5, 5 (summarizing drafting
process of UN Declaration and calling draft declaration prepared by 1991 expert group "first"
draft). For the text of the 1991 expert group meeting's draft declaration, see Monitonng the
Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women,
Violence Against Women in All Its Forms: Report of the Secretary-General, Commission
on the Status of Women, U.N. ESCOR, 36th Sess., app., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
FCN.6/1992/4 (1991) (initial draft of UN Declaration) [hereinafter 1991 Expert Group Draft
Declaration].
76. See 1991 Expert Group Draft Declaration, supra note 75, at arts. 4(b), 4(f). The
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Commission on the Status of Women~i met from August 31 through
September 4, 1992.78 This working group drafted a final version of the UN
Declaration that included the qualifying references to national legislation in
Articles 4(c) and 4(d). 9 Thd Commission on the Status of Women
subsequently recommended the final draft to the UN Economic and Social
Council.8° The Economic and Social Council, m turn, endorsed the draft,"
and the General Assembly adopted the UN Declaration on December 20,
1993.82
1991 draft's Article 4(b) called for states to "include in domestic legislation penal and civil
sanctions to punish and redress the wrongs caused to women who are subjected-to violence
and to provide them with just and effective legal remedies, compensation and rehabilitation"
and did not qualify this responsibility with the phrase "as provided for by national legis-
lation." Id. at art. 4(b). Likewise, Article 4(f) of the 1991 draft says, without qualification,
that states shall "exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence
against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or are acts by private persons
condoned by the State." Id. at art. 4(f).
77 The Commission on the Status of Women prepares reports to the UN Economic and
Social Council on the promotion of women's rights and makes recommendations to the
Economic and Social Council on current, urgent problems in the area of women's rights.
NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 45, at 101. The
Working Group on Communications on the Status of Women considers communications that
aid m the determination of trends that indicate pressing problems concerning women's rights.
Id. at 104. The Economic and Social Council elects members to the Commission on the
Status of Women as follows: 13 members from African states; 11 from Asian states; 4 from
Eastern European states; 9 from Latin American and Caribbean states; and 8 from Western
European and other states, Id. at 101.
78. See E.S.C. Res. 1992/18, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 19-20, 5, U.N. Doc.
EI1992/92 (1993) (deciding to convene intersessional working group of Commission on Status
of Women to continue drafting declaration on elimination of violence against women, taking
into account 1991 draft); see also Monitoring the Implementation of the Nairobi Forward-
looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, Elimination of Violence Against Women:
Report of the Secretary-General, Commission on the Status of Women, U.N. ESCOR, 37th
Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc E/CN.6/1993/12 (1992) (report of working group of
Commission on the Status of Women that met in Vienna from August 31 to September 4,
1992) [hereinafter Report of 1992 CSW Working Group].
79. See Report of 1992 CSW Working Group, supra note 78, app. I, at arts. 4(c) and
4(d) (referencing national legislation with respect to state.duties).
80. See Report of the Commission on the Status of Women on Its Thirty-Seventh Session,
U.N. ESCOR, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/1993/27 (1993) (recommending that Economic and Social
Council adopt draft declaration).
81. See Violence Against Women in All Its Forms, E.S.C. Res. 1993/26, U.N. ESCOR,
Supp. No. 1, at 42-43, 3, U.N. Doc. E/1993/93 (1994) (urging states to support adoption
m UN General Assembly of draft declaration on elimination of violence against women).
82. UN Declaration, supra note 2. The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly
had recommended to the UN General Assembly adoption of the declaration on the elimination
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Commentators have suggested that the UN Declaration's references to
national legislation defer to national, rather than international, standards to
judge a state's fulfillment of its responsibilities under Articles 4(c) and 4(d)
and that these references weaken the UN Declaration.83 The argument that
the national legislation references defer to national standards to judge
compliance is a straightforward one. By the language of Articles 4(c) and
4(d), a state should, in the manner that the state's legislation dictates, pumsh
acts of violence against women and provide access to just and effective
remedies for the harm that results from such violence.' A particular state
thus arguably would fulfill these two significant responsibilities merely by
following the state's own law when punishing gender-based violence and in
providing access to remedies. Use of a national, rather than international,
standard in this context carries severe negative implications.' First,
deference to national standards poses the danger of permitting a government
essentially to define for itself its compliance with the UN Declaration.86
Second, particularly in an area still very much in the developmental process,
deference to national standards threatens the development of international
standards with respect to eliminating violence against women."
1 Danger of Permitting a State to Define Its Compliance
Deference to national standards would permt a government to define
its own compliance with the UN Declaration;8  should that state's legislation
inadequately punish and insufficiently redress violence against women, the
of violence against women. Advancement of Women: Report of the Third Committee, 48th
Sess., Agenda Item 111, 23, U.N. Doe. A/48/629 (1993).
83. See supra note 24 (giving examples of commentators who view UN Declaration's
references to national legislation as problematic).
84. See UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 4(c) (saying that states should exercise
due diligence to punish "in accordance with national legislation" acts of violence against
women); id. at art. 4(d) (saying that states should provide women subjected to violence with
access "as provided for by national legislation" to just and effective remedies).
85. See Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 3-4 (viewing UN Declaration's references to
national, instead of international, standards as problematic); Sullivan, supra note 16, at 166
(stating that national legislation references undermine normative force of UN Declaration's
state responsibility provision).
86. See mfra part IlI.A.1 (examining danger of allowing state to define its own
compliance with UN Declaration).
87 See mfra part III.A.2 (discussing need for development of standards on elimination
of violence against women).
88. See generally infra notes 89-131 and accompanying text (examining problem of
permitting state to define its own compliance with UN Declaration).
1124
ELIMINATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
UN Declaration would fail to secure the rights and freedoms that the
declaration seeks to protect. There would be no pressing need for mterna-
tional measures to protect women against violence if existing national
structures were already doing a sufficient job; therefore, deference to
national standards within the UN Declaration would have quite an under-
mining influence.89 Essentially, the UN Declaration's statement that states
should punish violence against women and provide access to remedies for
violence would do little to foster those goals if a government merely could
manipulate its own law to avoid its responsibilities under the UN Declara-
tion. Moreover, such a loophole would run counter to the overall spirit of
the UN Declaration, which calls states to develop all legal, political,
admunstrative, and cultural measures to protect women against violence.9°
Even if the UN Declaration's references to national legislation do provide
a means of avoiding the UN Declaration's obligations for states, that does not
mean that states therefore would be unaccountable on the international level
for human rights offenses with respect to violence against women.9 Overlaps
exist between the UN Declaration's provisions and protections found in other
human rights conventions.' The UN Declaration and the Inter-American
Convention explicitly recognize that women have rights that violence impli-
cates and that other "mainstream" human rights instruments already secure.93
The Inter-American Convention states that every woman has the right to the
protection and exercise of every human right found in regional and inter-
national human rights mstruments. 94 For example, a woman possesses the
89. See Culliton, supra note 18, at 516-21 (examining domestic legal systems' inade-
quacy with respect to domestic violence problem); see also infra notes 124-26 and accom-
panying text (discussing current inadequate protection of women's rights).
90. See UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 4(f) (saying that states should develop
comprehensively all measures to protect women from violence).
91. See infra notes 98-122 (discussing state accountability for tolerating violence against
women under international human rights instruments other than UN Declaration).
92. Id.
93. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4 (listing examples of rights
to which women are entitled that regional and international human rights instruments em-
body); UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 3 (same).
94. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art 4. For a look at the kinds of
human rights instruments that the drafters of the Inter-American Convention considered while
drafting that convention, see Relevant Conventions, Protocols, Declarations and Resolu-
tions of the United Nations, Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts to Consider the Pre-
liminary Draft of Inter-American Convention of Women and Violence, OEA/Ser.L/II.7.5,
CIM/RECOVI/doc.9/93 (listing international human rights instruments of United Nations
relevant to drafting of Inter-American Convention on violence against women); RelevantJ7
Conventions, Protocols and Resolutions of the Organization of American States and the
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right to have her life and physical, mental, and moral integrity respected, the
right to personal security, and the right to simple and timely recourse to a
court for violations of such rights.95 Similarly, the UN Declaration states
that women have a right to equal protection of human rights and freedoms
in every area - civil, political, economic, social, and cultural. 96 The UN
Declaration cites several international human rights instruments that
guarantee some of these human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.'
Existing human rights instruments arguably already protect human
rights that are relevant to the protection of women from violence.98 As
discussed in Part II, CEDAW issued General Recommendation 19, an
authoritative interpretation of the Women's Convention, which stated, m
part, that gender-based violence may violate provisions of the Women's
Convention even though those provisions do not refer explicitly to violence
against women.99 CEDAW also concluded that a state may be held account-
Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM), Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts to
Consider the Preliminary Draft of Inter-American Convention on Women and Violence,
OEAISer.L/1.7.5, CIMIRECOVI/doc.8/93 (listing OAS measures relevant to drafting of
Inter-American Convention on elimination of violence against women).
95. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4.
96. UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 3.
97 Id. at art. 3 nn.6-11.
98. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 32, at 326-35 (arguing, in part, that state may be
accountable under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for failure to combat
domestic violence based on broad language of Covenant and on movement toward holding
states parties accountable for systemic inaction); Copelon, supra note 5, at 116-52 (discussing
possibility of conceptualizing domestic violence as form of torture sanctionable under
germane human rights conventions, as well as recognizing need to see domestic violence as
distinct kind of human rights abuse); Culliton, supra note 18, at 526 (discussing state
responsibility regarding domestic violence and explaining that rights to life, physical integrity,
and equality before law, which international human rights instruments secure, imply right to
be free from domestic violence). For a chart providing a nonexhaustive list of rights that
international human rights conventions secure that are relevant to combating violence against
women, see Expert Group Meeting on Violence Against Women: Report (Unedited), Division
for the Advancement of Women, at Annex I, EGMIVAW/1991/1 (1991). Speaking about
violence against women in the context of rape in armed conflicts, Frangoise Krill has said that
"[i]f women in real life are not always protected as they should be, it is not due to lack of a
legal basis." Frangoise Krill, The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law,
249 INT'L REV RED CRoss 337, 359 (1985).
99. See General Recommendation 19, supra note 43, 6 (stating that gender-based
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able for private, as well as state, acts of violence against women if that state
does not use due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish, and remedy
gender-based violence.c° Thus, even if the UN Declaration's references to
national legislation provide a means of avoiding obligations enunciated in the
UN Declaration, states parties to the Women's Convention retain comparable
duties under that binding convention. 10 Similarly, the Inter-American
Convention would bind states parties to that convention to the duties that the
Inter-American Convention establishes regardless of whether the UN Declar-
ation effectively secures the rights that the declaration seeks to protect.li2
In addition, Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights 3
secures the rights to physical integrity and to humane treatment by stlting
that no person may be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment."° Article 4 of that convention recognizes the right to life 05
and Article 7 recognizes the right to personal security " These rights to
violence may violate even those provisions of Women's Convention that do not refer explic-
itly to violence against women).
100. Id. 9.
101. See UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 6 (stating explicitly that UN Declaration
does not affect provisions in state legislation or "any international convention, treaty or other
instrument in force in a State" that can work more effectively to eliminate violence against
women). Commentators have pointed out some limitations that arise in relying on the
Women's Convention to address the issue of violence against women. See Charlesworth,
supra note 5, at 2 (stating that impact of CEDAW's work on violence against women as dis-
crimnation under Women's Convention only affects states parties to Women's Convention);
Culliton, supra note 18, at 528 (stating that Women's Convention is not best mechanism for
enforcement of women's rights within international arena). Culliton notes that, although
General Recommendation 19 is an authoritative interpretation of the Women's Convention,
General Recommendation 19 does not bind the states parties. Culliton, supra note 18, at 528.
In addition, Culliton points out the weak enforcement powers of CEDAW Id. However,
Culliton argues that, given increased enforcement power and/or increased voluntary com-
pliance, the Women's Convention could be an effective means of confronting the problem of
violence against women. Id. at 540.
102. See UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 6 (providing expressly that UN Declara-
tion does not affect provisions in state legislation or "any international convention, treaty or
other instrument in force in a State" more conducive to achieving elimination of violence
against women).
103. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov 22, 1969, 9 LL.M. 673 (1970).
104. Id. at art. 5(2). Article 5(2) states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment." Id. Article 5(1) states that "[e]very
person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected." Id. at art.
5(1).
105. Id. at art. 4.
106. Id. at art. 7
1127
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1109 (1995)
life, personal security, humane treatment, and respect of physical, mental,
and moral integrity speak directly to the lands of rights that a victim of
violence loses." Article 1(1) mandates that the states parties to the Amen-
can Convention on Human Rights respect and ensure the rights and
freedoms recognized in that convention.' °8 In the Veldsquez Rodriguez
Case,'09 which involved the forcible detention and disappearance of a
Honduran university student, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
stated that Article l(1)'s duty to "ensure" rights, such as the right to
humane treatment, implies a state obligation to take reasonable steps to
prevent a human rights violation, to investigate the violation seriously, to
impose an appropriate punishment, and to compensate the victim ade-
quately "0 The Inter-American Court said that the duty to ensure rights
107 See Roth, supra note 32, at 327 (stating that domestic violence arguably implicates
right to life, right to security of person, and right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment); Culliton, supra note 18, at 508 (arguing that state's toler-
ance of domestic violence violates right to life and right to freedom from torture). Culliton
states that under any analysis of state accountability for domestic violence, the two funda-
mental rights implicated are the right to physical integrity and the right to equal protection
of the law. Culliton, supra note 18, at 514.
108. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 103, at art. 1(1).
109 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1988 Annual Report of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights 35 (1988) (judgment).
110. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 1988 Annual Report
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 35, 174 (1988) (judgment). In Veldsquez
Rodrifguez, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights addressed the question of when a par-
ticular act that violates a right found in the American Convention on Human Rights (Con-
vention) can be imputed to a state party, thereby making that state internationally accountable.
Id. 160. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights concluded that a state may be held
accountable under Article 1(1) of the Convention for failing to use due diligence to prevent
or to respond to a private person's or state agent's violation of a right guaranteed in the
Convention. Id. 172.
In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Commission) received a petition against the State of Honduras filed pursuant to
Article 44 of the Convention. Id. 3. The petition alleged that members of the Honduran
Office of Investigations and of the Honduran armed forces forcibly detained Angel Manfredo
Velisquez Rodriguez (Manfredo VelAsquez) on September 12, 1981. Id. The petition
asserted that Manfredo Veldsquez was accused of political crimes and tortured. Id. The
police and security forces denied that they had detained Manfredo Veldsquez. Id. Ulti-
mately, after a process of inquiry seeking information from the Honduran government, the
Commission concluded that the Honduran government's report on this matter was insufficient
and that "all evidence shows that Angel Manfredo Veldsquez Rodriguez is still missing and
that the Government of Honduras has not offered convincing proof that would allow the
Commission to determine that the allegations are not true." Id. 4-10. The Commission
referred the case to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (Court), which had juris-
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recogmzed m the American Convention on Human Rights extends to human
rights violations that private parties commit as well as to human rights
violations that state agents perpetrate. 1 ' A state would not be held
internationally responsible for the act of a private party'in and of itself, but
for the state's failure to use due diligence to prevent, investigate, punish,
and provide a remedy for the violation."2 Thus, one could argue that
Article 1(1) makes a state party to the American Convention on Human
Rights accountable when that state party does not use due diligence to
prevent and respond to private acts of violence against women.1 3 Then,
diction over Honduras because Honduras had formally recognized that court's jurisdiction
over it with respect to the interpretation and application of the American Convention on
Human Rights. Id. 10-11.
The Commission asked the Court to find that Honduras had violated the rights that Arti-
cles 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), and 7 (right to personal liberty)
guaranteed to Manfredo Veldsquez under the Convention. Id. 159. The Court examined
Article 1(1) of the Convention, which describes the states parties' obligation to "respect the
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction
the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms." Id. 161. Because a state party
must respect and ensure the rights recognized by the Convention, a public authority's
violation of the Convention is imputable to the state. Id. 169-72. The Court recognized,
however, that a state party may be held responsible not only for failing to ensure that state
agents do not commit human rights offenses, but also for failing to take reasonable steps to
prevent, punish, and investigate a violative act that a private party perpetrates. Id. 172.
The Court described a theory of accountability through complicity, stating that when private
parties' violations of the Convention are not investigated seriously, those private persons are,
m effect, being aided by the government. Id. 177 For that reason, the state is held respon-
sible in the international arena. Id. After discussing the specific facts of the case and the
inadequacy of the Honduran government's action to ensure the respect of Manfredo
Velasquez's rights, the Court stated that it strongly believed that the detention and disappear-
ance of Manfredo VelLsquez was the work of agents acting under public authority Id. 182.
However, the Court also pointed out explicitly that evei'if public agents were not responsible
for Manfredo Veldsquez's disappearance, the proven failure of the Honduran state apparatus
to act effectively constituted a failure to fulfill Honduras's duties under Article 1(1). Id; The
Court concluded that Honduras violated Articles 4, 5, and 7 of the American Convention on
Human Rights. Id. 185.
111. Id. 172. The Inter-American Court stated:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not directly
imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a private person or because
the person responsible has not been identified) can lead to international responsibility
of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.
Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. See Culliton, supra note 18, at 549-53 (making argument under American Con-
vention on Human Rights, read in light of Veldsquez Rodrguez, for state responsibility for
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regardless of whether the UN Declaration's references to national
legislation provide a means of avoiding the duty to punish and to provide
access to just and effective remedies as enunciated in the UN Declaration,
the American Convention on Human Rights would hold states parties to that
convention accountable for the failure to exercise due diligencl to prevent
and remedy violence perpetrated against women.'
14
One can make a similar argument under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights." 5 Article 7 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights states that no person may be subjected to torture
or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 6 The Human Rights Com-
mittee' 17 has interpreted Article 7 to encompass acts perpetrated by private
failing to investigate and punish domestic violence).
114. See UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 6 (stating expressly that UN Declaration
does not affect provisions in state legislation or "any international convention, treaty or other
instrument in force in a State" more conducive to achieving elimination of violence against
women).
115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, see Copelon, supra note 5, at 140-41 (arguing for interpretation of Article 7 of Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides for right to be free from
torture and cruel or degrading treatment, that would hold state accountable for human rights
violation if that state fails to exercise due diligence in investigation and punishment of
domestic violence); Roth, supra note 32, at 327 (stating that provisions of International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that are arguably applicable to domestic violence
include Article 6(i) (right to life), Article 7 (right not to be subjected to torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment), and Article 9(i) (right to security of person)). Roth
makes the argument that the theory of state accountability by omission may apply to hold
a state responsible for a human rights violation for systematic failure to prevent and re-
spond to domestic violence appropriately Roth, supra note 32, at 331. In addition, Roth
argues that a state is responsible under Article 2(i) and the antidiscrimination provisions
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, such as Article 26, if it treats
violence against women differently than other forms of violence. Id. at 333-35. Article 26
states that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrim-
ination to the equal protection of the law " International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra, at art. 26. Roth sees the advantages of the antidiscrimination argument with
respect to the Covenant's protection of women against violence as at least two-fold: First, this
argument allows the international community to evaluate a state's efforts to confront vio-
lence against women even beyond the point at which a state is held accountable based on
total inaction on its part with respect to violence perpetrated against women; second, a
state would be accountable for discriminatory enforcement of a criminal law under Art-
icle 26 regardless of whether violence by private persons is ultimately found to violate
the "physical-integrity" guarantees that the Covenant secures. Roth, supra note 32, at
333-35.
116. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 115, at art. 7
117 The Human Rights Committee is composed of nationals of states parties to the
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persons.1 18 Article 6 secures the right to life, "I and Article 9 states that
every person has the right to security of person. 2 ' In addition, like Article
1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights,' Article 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that every state
party to that covenant agrees to respect and to "ensure" the rights that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes.1
22
Thus, even if the UN Declaration's references to national legislation
are interpreted as providing states with a means to avoid some obligations
listed in the UN Declaration, one can argue strongly that existing inter-
national human rights instruments apply to gender-based violence.123 How-
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 45, at 54. The Human Rights Committee members serve
in their personal, rather than in their official, capacities. Id. The Human Rights Committee
members have the power to consider reports of states parties on state compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. Some of the states parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have also recognized the Human Rights
Committee as a competent body to consider communications from individuals on alleged
human rights violations. Id. at 54-55.
118. See General Comment 20, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., [1992]
COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES 29, 29 2, U.N. Doe. HRI/GEN/1 (stating that states
parties to International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must give protection against
acts that Article 7 bars, including acts perpetrated by private persons). Specifically, General
Comment 20 states that "[i]t is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection
through legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited by
article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their officialcapacity, outside their official
capacity or in a private capacity." Id. (emphasis added); see also INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAw GROUP, supra note 61, at 9-11 (pointing out that Human Rights Committee has
interpreted Article 7 to reach private acts).
119. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 115, at art. 6.
120. Id. at art. 9.
121. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (discussing implications of American
Convention on Human Rights Article 1(1) guarantee that state party undertakes to respect and
"ensure" rights recognized in that convention).
122. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 115, at art. 2.
123. See supra notes 98-122 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that existing
human rights instruments encompass violence against women). In addition, Theo van Boven,
as SpecialRapporteur for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities, has conducted a study and written a report on the rights to restitution,
compensation, and rehabilitation for victims of gross human rights violations. Study Con-
cerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Final Report Submitted by Mr
Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Item 4, U.N. Doc.
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ever, one also must recognize the past shortcomings of generally applicable
human rights instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the American Covenant on Human Rights, with respect
to the protection of women's rights. 2 4 It is undeniable that generally
applicable human rights instruments have not protected women sufficiently
up to this point."z As one commentator has stated, "the attempt to improve
the position of women through more generally applicable measures has
allowed women's concerns to be submerged by what are regarded as more
'global' issues."'' 26
EICN.41Sub.2199318 (1993). In the final report, Mr. van Boven names violence against
women as one especially relevant issue with respect to his study on the right to reparation.
Id. 22. In the section of the report proposing basic principles and guidelines, Mr. van
Boven submits as a proposal of basic principles that "tt]he obligation to ensure respect for
human rights includes the duty to prevent violations, the duty to investigate violations,
the duty to take appropriate action against the violators, and the duty to afford remedies to
victims." Id. 137(2). Under this principle as proposed, states arguably would be account-
able for failure to exercise appropriate care to punish those who commit acts of violence
against women and for failure to provide access to remedies for victims of gender-based
violence.
124. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (pointing out that generally applicable
human rights instruments have not been applied to prevent, punish, and eliminate violence
against women).
125. See Commission on the Status of Women: Report on the Thirty-Eighth Session, supra
note 68, ch. IV, 25 (observing that interpretation and application of universal human rights
instruments have not resulted in protection of women's rights at same level as men's rights);
see also Cook, supra note 8, at 252 (noting that, except for CEDAW, most UN committees'
general comments do not integrate gender issues substantially into work of those bodies);
Culliton, supra note 18, at 532 (pointing out that failure of traditional interpretations of inter-
national human rights law to acknowledge state duty to combat violence against women
prompted drafting of Inter-American Convention); Fitzpatrick, supra note 6, at 558 (suggest-
ing pressuring human rights bodies to address violence against women within respective
scopes of authority). For suggestions on the integration of gender analysis into the work of
the entire UN, especially UN human rights bodies, see Priority Themes, Peace: Measures to
Eradicate Violence Against Women in the Family and Society, Report by the Secretary-
General, supra note 5, at 12.
126. Charlesworth, supra note 20, at 66 (paraphrasing Laura Reanda, The Commission
on the Status of Women, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL 267 (Philip Alston ed., 1992), on costs of relying on "mainstream" human
rights bodies to address issues of particular concern to women). Charlesworth and Reanda
also recognize the costs associated with the international community's concentrating on
creating specialized mechanisms to deal with women's issues: "Mhe price of the creation
of separate institutional mechanisms and special measures dealing with women within
the United Nations system has typically been the creation of a 'women's ghetto,' given
less power, fewer resources, and a lower priority than 'mainstream' human rights bodies."
Id.
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2. Danger to the Development of International Standards
with Respect to Eliminating Violence Against Women
The international community has not yet fully developed standards
with respect to violence against women.' 27 An expert group that met in
October 1993, through the efforts of the UN Division for the Advancement
of Women, proposed the development of universal standards and minimum
response guidelines for violence against women. 128 Governments probably
would disfavor the application of fixed, mandated guidelines because states
often try to insulate their national legislation from intrusion by international
human rights norms. 29 Alternatively, a human rights instrument that seeks
to eliminate violence against women could require states to "ensure" a cer-
tain result without specifically dictating the manner in which states obtain
that result. 3' Regardless of the ultimate approach, in the final analysis the
question of whether a state has complied with its international human rights
responsibilities must be answered against the backdrop of an international,
not national, standard.' 3'
Moreover, given the developing nature of international human rights
standards regarding the protection of women against violence, the
references to national legislation in the UN Declaration pose an important,
though subtle, danger. If the UN Declaration truly defers to national
standards, this deference to individual state notions of responsibility may
inhibit the development of international standards in the area of violence
against women. The UN Declaration states that UN bodies should promote
127 See Cook, supra note 8, at 250-51 (stating that consensus of lawyer consultation
group was that more work is required regarding theories of state responsibility to hold state
liable for not preventing, investigating, and punishing violations of women's rights).
128. See Pnoriy Themes, Peace: Measures to Eradicate Violence Against Women in the
Family and Society: Report by the Secretary-General, supra note 5, at 12-13 (proposing
development of universal guidelines regarding violence against women).
129. Cf. Adrminstration Submits Women's Convention to Senate; Hopesfor Action Before
Adjournment, WASH. WKLY. REP 3, 4 (United Nations Association of the United States of
America ed., Sept. 23, 1994) (quoting one of Clinton Administration's proposed reservations
to Women's Convention, which stated that United States would not accept obligation to enact
legislation relating to private conduct). In 1994, when the Clinton Administration tried to
obtain Senate ratification of the Women's Convention, it submitted a proposal to the Senate
that included the following reservation: "[The United States] does not accept any obligation
under the Convention to enact legislation or to take any other action with respect to private
conduct except as mandated by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id.
130. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text (discussing implications of pro-
visions in human rights conventions that state must undertake to "ensure" rights).
131. See supra part MlI.A.1 (discussing dangers of deference to national standards).
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the process of formulating guidelines with respect to violence against
women.' 32 However, the fact that the UN Declaration's references to
national legislation may be read to permit a state to define its own com-
pliance with the UN Declaration weakens the impetus to formulate inter-
national standards in this area and fosters diverging national practices.
Thus, over time, reaching a consensus on meaningful international standards
is made more difficult.
B. Alternative Interpretation: The UN Declaration's References
to National Legislation as Merely a Procedural Proviso
The UN Declaration is not the only international human rights instru-
ment that qualifies some state responsibilities with a reference to national
legislation. A review of similar language in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights provides the basis for interpreting the UN Declara-
tion in a manner that does not give states the ability to manipulate national
legislation to avoid international human rights obligations.'33 Article 14(6)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides, under
certain circumstances, for the compensation "according to law" of persons
who have suffered miscarriages of justice." Similarly, Article 14(5) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights secures the right of
review of criminal convictions and sentences by higher tribunals "according
132. See UN Declaration, supra note 2, at 5(f) (encouraging UN organs and specialized
agencies to formulate guidelines on violence against women). Specifically, Article 5(f) of the
UN Declaration states that UN bodies within their particular areas of concern should
"[plromote the formulation of guidelines or manuals relating to violence against women,
taking into account the measures referred to in the present Declaration." Id. In addition, the
UN Declaration calls on states to encourage the development of guidelines for the imple-
mentation of the UN Declaration's principles. Id. at art. 4(n).
133. See generally infra notes 134-55 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation
of "according to law" provisos in provisions of International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
134. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 115, at art. 14(6).
Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and
when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on
the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively thtt there has
been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result
of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that
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to law "13' These. provisions for compensation and review "according to
law" are analogous to the UN Declaration's provisions that states should
punish acts of violence against women "in accordance with national legisla-
tion" and that states should provide just and effective remedies "as provided
for by national legislation. "136 The inclusion of the qualifier, "according to
the law," in Articles 14(5) and 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights is a recognition of the fact that providing appellate
review in criminal cases and providing compensation for miscarriages of
justice on a national level are not simple undertakings. 137 Consequently, a
state would need some sort of statutory framework to detail the mechanisms
for providing appellate review and for administering the task of providing
compensation for a miscarriage of justice. 131 Punishing violence against
women and providing women with access to remedies for harms suffered as
a result of such violence similarly would require a statutory framework.
Manfred Nowak, in his commentary on the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, states that the "according to law" proviso in
Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
clearly does not allow a state party to impair the right of review itself.
139
Rather, Nowak argues that the proviso permits a state party to make
decisions about how the right to appeal will be exercised in that state."'°
Indeed, the UN Human Rights Committee has acknowledged that Article
14(5)'s provision that review be "according to law" is just a procedural
proviso on the exercise of that right of review 14" In Salgar de Montejo v
Columbia,'42 the Human Rights Committee stated:
135. Id. at art. 14(5). Article 14(5) states that "[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall
have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according
to law." Id. (emphasis added).
136. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text (quoting UN Declaration's references
to national legislation in Articles 4(c) and 4(d)).
137 See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 271 (1993) (stating that complexity of providing compensation for miscarriage
of justice means that national implementation of right to compensation requires statutory
measures; hence drafters included "according to law" proviso in Article 14(6) of International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 267
140. Id.
141. See id. at 267 n.188 (citing Human Rights Committee decision that confirms inter-
pretation that proviso only attaches to determinations on how right is exercised).
142. No. 64/1979 (1979), reprnted in [1985] HUMAN RIGHTS CoMMITTEE: SELECTED
DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
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The Committee considers that the expression "according to law" m article
14(5) of the Covenant is not intended to leave the very existence of the
right of review to the discretion of the States parties, since the rights are
those recognized by the Covenant, and not merely those recogmzed by
domestic law Rather, what is to be determined "according to law" is the
modalities by which the review by a higher tribunal is to be carried out. 143
In Salgar de Montejo, the Human Rights Committee concluded that the
Columbian government should change its laws to effectuate the right secured
in Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 144
POLITICAL RIGHTS, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/l.
143. Salgar de Montejo v Columbia, No. 64/1979, at 127, 129-30 10.4 (1979),
repnnted in [1985] HUMAN RIGHTS CoMMrrrEE: SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/1. In Salgar de Montejo v Columbia, the Human Rights Committee considered
the question of whether the Columbian government breached Article 14(5)'s guarantee of a
right to appeal because its Statute of Security did not make a particular offense subject to
review by a higher tribunal. Id. at 127 1.2, 1.5. On November 7, 1979, a Columbian
military judge sentenced Consuelo Salgar de Montejo to one year of imprisonment for
allegedly violating the Statute of Security by selling a gun. Id. at 127 1.4. A week later,
the same judge confirmed her sentence under the procedure known as the recurso de
reposict6n, which was the sole procedural means of recourse that Salgar de Montejo had
under the Statute of Security for the type of offense that she allegedly had committed. Id. at
127-28 1.4, 7.1. On December 18, 1979, Salgar de Montejo submitted a communication
to the Human Rights Committee alleging, in part, that the Colombian government had
breached Article 14(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by enacting
the Statute of Security Id. at 127 1.2.
The Human Rights Committee expressed its view that the "according to law" proviso m
Article 14(5) was not meant to allow states parties the discretion to determine the substantive
question of whether such a right exists because "the rights are those recognized by the
Covenant, and not merely those recognized by domestic law." Id. at 129-30 10.4. Instead,
the Human Rights Committee read the "according to law" proviso as directed to the
determination of the mechanisms used to effectuate the Article 14(5) right to review by a
higher tribunal. Id. The Human Rights Committee then considered the fact that, whereas
the English text of Article 14(5) refers to a "crime" and the French text to "une infraction,"
the Spanish text of Article 14(5) refers solely to "un delito." Id. Salgar de Montejo's
sentence was for commission of an offense that Columbian law defined as "contravenci6n,"
not "un delito." Id. Notwithstanding the Columbian law's definition of Salgar de Montejo's
offense as "contravenci6n," the Human Rights Committee concluded that the sentence that
the military judge imposed on Salgar de Montejo was "serious enough, in all the circum-
stances," to necessitate that the government give Salgar de Montejo access to review by a
higher tribunal. Id. Consequently, the Human Rights Committee found that Colombia had
violated Article 14(5) and that Columbia should change its laws to secure Article 14(5)'s right
to review by a higher tribunal. Id. at 130 11, 12.
144. Id. at 130 12.
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The Human Rights Committee has sought information from states
parties about their various procedures for review under Article 14(5).45 In
considering state reports on state review procedures, the Human Rights
Committee has pointed out procedures that appeared inadequate to secure the
protection of a person's right of review under Article 14(5).46 When
examining a state report of Iraq, for example, the Human Rights Committee
looked specifically at the procedures that Iraq's Revolutionary Court em-
ployed. 4? The Revolutionary Court's findings were final; only in capital
punishment cases did the accused have any right of appeal.' 4 The represen-
tative of Iraq stated that, in practice, a condemned person could request
Iraq's President to review his or her case and, in that way, the President
constituted a quasi-court of appeal.'49 In response, a member of the Human
Rights Committee noted that the Iraqi legislation did not adequately secure
the full protection of Article 14(5) and stated that the Human Rights Com-
mittee would look forward to receiving information in the near future
regarding Iraq's efforts to provide a procedure that fully protects Article
14(5)'s right of review "
145. DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT OFTHEINTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS § 10.21 (1991).
146. Id; see, e.g., Suminary Records of the Meetings of the Eleventh to the Sixteenth Ses-
sions, [1981-1982] 1 Y.B. HUM. RTs. COMM. 194, 196 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/3 (consideration
of state report of Japan) (questioning whether particular Jokoku appeal of very limited scope met
Article 14(5) requirements); Suimnary Records of the Meetings of the Eleventh to the Sixteenth
Sessions, [1981-1982] 1 Y.B. HUM. RTS. COMM. 312, 314 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/3
(consideration of state report of Uruguay) (stating that right of appeal was not guaranteed in
Uruguay); Summary Records of the Meetings of the Sixth to the Tenth Sessions, [1979-1980] 1
Y.B. HUM. RTS. COMM. 411, 414 27, U.N. Doc. CCPR/2 (consideration of state report of
Costa Rica) (noting Costa Rican report's (U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/l/Add.46 (1979)) acknowledg-
ment of need for legislative reforms with respect to some unappealable sentences).
147 Summary Records of the Meetings of the Sixth to the Tenth Sessions, [1979-1980] 1
Y.B. HUM. RTs. COMM. 309, 314 29, U.N. Doc. CCPR/2 (consideration of state report of
Iraq) [hereinafter Human Rights Committee on Iraqi State Report]; see MCGOLDRICK, supra
note 145, § 10.21 (stating that Human Rights Committee questioned procedures of Iraq's
Revolutionary Court).
148. See Human Rights Committee on Iraqi State Report, supra note 147, at 314 30
(pointing out apparent discrepancy between procedure of Revolutionary Court and Article
14(5)); see also MCGoLDRICK, supra note 145, § 10.21 (discussing same).
149. Human Rights Committee on Iraqi State Report, supra note 147, at 314 31 (giving
reply of Iraqi representative to effect that all Iraqi citizens could appeal to President of Republic
from whom those citizens would have same protections and guarantees that courts provide); see
also MCGOLDRICK, supra note 145, § 10.21 (stating substance of Iraqi representative's reply
to question about compliance with Article 14(5)).
150. Summary Records of the Meetings of the Sixth to the Tenth Sessions, [1979-1980] 1
Y.B. HUM. RTS. COMM. 314, 316 7, U.N. Doe. CCPR/2 (consideration of state report of
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According to Manfred Nowak, the purpose of the "according to law"
proviso in Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights is the same as the "according to law" proviso in Article 14(5) of that
instrument: The proviso addresses the exercise of the Article 14(6) right of
compensation but does not permit states to change the substantive provisions
of Article 14(6).' The proviso does not allow states parties to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to avoid the obligation to
provide compensation for miscarriages of justice simply by failing to enact
the appropriate national legislation." As with Article 14(5), state reports
to the UN Human Rights Comnittee documented the inadequacy of state
action with respect to Article 14(6)'s right to compensation for miscarriages
of justice."3 The Human Rights Committee determined that many states
were failing to observe or to guarantee sufficiently the right to compensation
in cases involving miscarriages of justice that fell under Article 14(6)."' 4
Iraq). Specifically, Mr. Tomuschat of the Human Rights Committee stated that:
[D]espite the replies provided by the representative of Iraq, it still appeared that
Iraqi legislation failed to provide the full coverage and protection of the rights of
accused and convicted persons under article 14, paragraph 5, of the Covenant.
He hoped that the Committee would soon obtain further information of Iraqi
efforts to improve that situation.
Id., see also MCGOLDRICK, supra note 145, § 10.21 (discussing Human Rights Committee's
consideration of and reaction to Iraqi state report).
151. See NOWAK, supra note 137, at 271 (stating that Article 14(6) proviso addresses
exercise of right of performance).
152. Id. at 271. Nowak adds that if a state believes that it cannot implement the right
to compensation for a miscarriage of justice, then that state must submit a reservation to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with respect to that provision. Id.
Guyana, New Zealand, and Trinidad and Tobago have made such reservations. See id. at
757, 765, 768 (providing text of those reservations).
153. See General Comment 13 on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 21st Sess., [1992] COMPILATION OF
GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATY BODIES 13, 16 18, U.N. Doe. HRI/GEN/1 (commenting on inadequacy of state
action with respect to Article 14(6)).
154. Id., see also MCGOLDRICK, supra note 145, § 10.22 (stating that Human Rights
Committee members have tried to obtain information on how, and if, right to compensation
for miscarriages of justice has been put into force in domestic law). McGoldrick discusses
specifically the questions of several members of the Human Rights Commission about
whether the United Kingdom's previous system of ex gratia payments was in compliance with
Article 14(6)'s right to compensation. Id. For a comment by a Human Rights Committee
member on the United Kingdom's system for compensating people for miscarriages of justice,
see Summary Records of the Meetings of the Twenty-third to the Twenty-eighth Sessions,
[1985-1986] 1 Y.B. HUM. RTS. COMM. 202, 204 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/5.
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These state reports prompted the Human Rights Committee to comment that
states should supplement their domestic legislation, as needed, to fulfill the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'
Similarly., the reporting requirements in the UN Declaration may help
to ensure the adequacy of a state's national legislation on the punishment of
and remedies for violence perpetrated against women. 156  Article 4(m)
provides that states should "[i]nclude, m submitting reports as required
under relevant human rights instruments of the United Nations, information
pertaining to violence against women and measures taken to implement the
present Declaration. " " Article 5(g) instructs the UN organs and specialized
agencies to "[c]onsider the issue of the elimination of violence against
women, as appropriate, m fulfilling their mandates with respect to the
implementation of human rights instruments.""' Reports to CEDAW under
the Women's Convention may be particularly helpful m monitoring to ensure
that states provide adequate punishment and remedies for violence against
women. With its General Recommendation 12, adopted in 1989, CEDAW
already has called states parties to the Women's Convention to provide
information in their state reports to CEDAW on the occurrence of violence
against women and the national measures used to fight violence against
women. 159
IV Conclusion
By analogy to Articles 14(5) and 14(6) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, one could interpret the UN Declaration's refer-
ences to national legislation as a mere proviso on the procedures for the
punishment of violence against women and the exercise of the right to just
and effective remedies."6 Under this interpretation, a state could not cir-
155. General Comment 13 on Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 153, at 16 18 (commenting that states, where needed, must en-
hance their national legislation to "bring it into line" with Article 14(6)).
156. See Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 3-4 (explaining that some international super-
vision on adequacy of national legislative remedies may be possible through UN Declaration's
Articles 4(m) and 5(g)).
157 UN Declaration, supra note 2, at art. 4(m).
158. Id. at art. 5(g).
159 See Charlesworth, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing General Recommendation 12, m
which CEDAW recommended to states parties to Women's Convention that they provide
information on violence against women in their state reports).
160. See supra part IILB (drawing analogy between UN Declaration's references to nat-
ional legislation and such references in Articles 14(5) and 14(6) of International Covenant on
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cumvent its international human rights obligations under the UN Declaration
through maction or inadequate domestic legislation on violence against
women.161 On the other hand, one also could read the UN Declaration as
deferring to national standards to judge a state's fulfillment of its responsibil-
ities under the UN Declaration. 62 The implications of the latter mterpreta-
tion include the possibility that a state could evade its international human
rights responsibilities under the UN Declaration by manipulating its own
domestic law 163 Therefore, the wording of the Inter-American Convention,
which does not use qualifying references to national legislation in its delinea-
tion of state responsibilities, is preferable for future conventions on violence
against women. At the very least, if drafters of future conventions on vio-
lence against women use such references to national legislation, they should
clarify within that same instrument the purpose of those references. Specifi-
cally, the drafters should document that the references act only as procedural
provisos and that state conduct ultimately must measure up to international
standards.
Civil and Political Rights).
161. See supra notes 139-55 and accompanying text (examining implications of inter-
pretation of UN Declaration's references to national legislation as being merely proviso
regarding exercise of right and not means to impair substance of that right).
162. See supra part III.A (discussing interpretation of UN Declaration as deferring to
national standards).
163. See supra part In.A (analyzing dangers associated with interpretation of UN
Declaration's qualification of state duties by reference to national legislation as deference to
national standards).
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